BA B777 departs on too short runway

[regi]

A BA B777 used only half of the runway to depart from St Kitts but luckely made it .

Very scary, especially because some people realised what was wrong.
Positively: it shows the power of the B777
http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/20 ... xiing.html
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-11153545

The conclusions are also very worrying: it shows that each time you take a flight your life depends on the combination of human errors.

[Stij]

A BA B777 used only half of the runway to depart from St Kitts but luckely made it .

Very scary, especially because some people realised what was wrong.
Positively: it shows the power of the B777
http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/20 ... xiing.html
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-11153545

The conclusions are also very worrying: it shows that each time you take a flight your life depends on the combination of human errors.

Great! So a 777 can take-off from ANR!!!

Cheers,

Stij

[Bralo20]

Very scary, especially because some people realised what was wrong.

The people who reacted where BA personnel who were en route to home.

Fortunately this turned out well, but it could be a disaster...

The full report can be downloaded at the AAIB site: http://www.aaib.gov.uk/publications/for ... ctions.cfm

[Crosswind]

The conclusions are also very worrying: it shows that each time you take a flight your life depends on the combination of human errors.

And that's why a well rested crew is vital. That's why all these stupid JAA Flight time/Duty time rules are dangerous and purely economically oriented.

Jesus, that's not new... But nothing changes.

[regi]

A BA B777 used only half of the runway to depart from St Kitts but luckely made it .

Very scary, especially because some people realised what was wrong.
Positively: it shows the power of the B777
http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/20 ... xiing.html
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-11153545

The conclusions are also very worrying: it shows that each time you take a flight your life depends on the combination of human errors.

Great! So a 777 can take-off from ANR!!!

Cheers,

Stij

yep: full breaks, full power, release breaks and off you go, as on an aircraft carrier-without-catapult.

[Bralo20]

The full reports shows that it was airborne in only 860 meters

[earthman]

Great! So a 777 can take-off from ANR!!!

Cheers,

Stij

My thought exactly, when will they start selling tickets for ANR-LAX?

[tolipanebas]

So a 777 can take-off from ANR!!!

Mind you, this 777 wasn't heading back to LHR though, it was performing a short hop in the Caribbean, before heading home and as such it was -luckily- lightly loaded!

A 777 can easily take off from ANR (so can an A380 even), its just that it can't make it much further than say OST or AMS. Not really useful, is it?

And that's why a well rested crew is vital. That's why all these stupid JAA Flight time/Duty time rules are dangerous and purely economically oriented.

Indeed, all those long haul triangulars are tricky!

There is no way a flight crew is as alert as they should be for their second flight after first having flown up tot 10 hours on an intercontinental flight!

How do you feel after arriving to ORD or BKK for instance? Why should it be different for pilots, then?

Long haul triangulars without relief crew should be banned asap, but the airlines oppose it on economic grounds, hence the Authorities are reluctant to enforce it, despite the overwhelming scientific evidence it should.

[jan_olieslagers]

The conclusions are also very worrying: it shows that each time you take a flight your life depends on the combination of human errors.

Of course. We've all known that since the beginning of flight. Besides, it's no different for trains or boats or coaches or whatever travelling machine.

Then again, human errors CAN and DO happen. That's why there exist procedures, and that's also why wherever possible several humans are to team up - like a captain and f/o - or even several teams have to collaborate - like plane crew and ATC. While I do agree that crew needs to be well rested - they need sufficient brakes, as Regi might write - I wonder about the silence concerning ATC responsability. Surely a ground controller should SEE what is happening? How did tower ever deliver a T/O clearance without having checked the 777 was at the proper and intended place? Perhaps they even have ground radar?

[sdbelgium]

He saw they were at the wrong intersection, but "did not have enough confidence to challenge the crew's decision" and thought "surely, they must know what they are doing, knowing the performances of their a/c".

And I doubt they have ground radar at an airport that doens't even have ground markings to indicate taxiways and holding points.

[jan_olieslagers]

He saw they were at the wrong intersection, but "did not have enough confidence to challenge the crew's decision" and thought "surely, they must know what they are doing, knowing the performances of their a/c".

That's an explanation of my feet*. A person not confident of doing a proper job should never work at a control tower. That is to say, if at least they have a tower...

And I doubt they have ground radar at an airport that doens't even have ground markings to indicate taxiways and holding points.

After taking a look at the place on satellite photography, I find it easy to agree.

* nen uitleg van mijn voeten

[Stij]

Mind you, this 777 wasn't heading back to LHR though, it was performing a short hop in the Caribbean, before heading home and as such it was -luckily- lightly loaded!

I know, that's why the smiley was behind the sentence.

Cheers,

Stij

[sdbelgium]

That's an explanation of my feet*. A person not confident of doing a proper job should never work at a control tower. That is to say, if at least they have a tower...

I completely agree. This was a trainee ATCO and thus did not yet have the confidence to act on his own in such difficult situations, it says in the report. His supervisor, who was standing next to him, did not take action as well, he felt the crew must know what they do and "was aware that a B777 could take off in such a short distance". Very professional, I must say, especially as the crew indicated they would like to take off from the ALPHA intersection just minutes before.

[chrisflyer]

Dear all,

This was not a "triangular" flight. The routing is LGW-ANU-SKB-ANU-LGW. The AAIB report indicates they were operating ANU-SKB-ANU, and the personnel information indeed confirms that both the Captain and the F/O had performed only 1 hour in the 24 hours preceding the incident. Thus, fatigue was not a contributing factor. Presumably they couldn't wait to get back to Antigua and hit the pool. Both operated out of SKB for the first time - it is unbelievable that they did not do a taxi briefing.

Have a look at this crucial part of the R/T:
ATC: “SPEEDBIRD TWO ONE FIVE SIX ERR DO YOU NOT REQUEST ERR BACKTRACK RUNWAY ZERO SEVEN”
G-VIIR: “ERR NEGATIVE SPEEDBIRD TWO ONE FIVE SIX WE ARE HAPPY TO GO FROM POSITION ALPHA”
ATC: “ROGER CLEARED TAKE OFF RUNWAY ZERO SEVEN WIND ZERO NINE ZERO ONE ZERO KNOTS”
G-VIIR: CLEARED FOR TAKE OFF ZERO SEVEN SPEEDBIRD TWO ONE FIVE SIX”

They thought they were at Alpha and ATC did not correct them. The trainee ATCO apparently had been told "not to be forceful with pilots" and therefore he didn't say anything. His supervisor claims not to recall the crew having reported being at Alpha.

My two cents: Sloppiness and lack of discipline on both parts, crew and ATC. Lucky nothing went awry.

Chris

[Homo Aeroportus]

Can you find a Swiss cheese large enough to have that many holes in it?
Leave alone having them all aligned !

* Poor design/maintenance of the infrastructure. No ground markings (TWY C/L), no TWY guidance signs / holding psn.
* Three (3) years before the incident, the CAA inspection noted the absence of holding psn signs and urgent (corrective) action was needed.
* Lack of signage not reported in AIP.
* No filing to ICAO of State difference with Annex 14.
* BA New Destination Assessment was made on "commercially available charts and Notams"; no site visit prior to commencing service.
* SATCO : "Misidentification of TWY B for A is a weekly occurence".
* First time there for both pilots, yet no taxi brief and the Commander is nose in with his checklist while F/O drives an unfamiliar/unclear taxi routing.
* Hint of ATCO "Alpha is parallel to the RWY", yet F/O goes straight onto Bravo. Intersection A is 1.2 km away from the terminal, B is right out of the apron. ANyone had a look, at the chart before?
* Cabin crew member in the cockpit; heard of sterile cockpit before?
* ATCO insufficiently clear with " Do you request backtrack ", instead of " Do you intend to take off from current BRAVO psn, not Alpha ? ".
* Answer "We're happy to go from ALPHA", unchallenged by ATCO.
* The Commander stated the RWY looks very short and advised PF to apply 55% N1 before brake release, without question any further the initial decision (intersection A instead of full RWY length) nor his actual position.
* There are Runway Distance Markers (on the LH side); not used by pilots though they entered the RWY at the 4000-ft mark (may not have been visible from the intersection tough) and the 3000, 2000 and 1000-ft must have been clearly visible. That's what RDM are for dude.
* The Station Enginer realizes the situation, makes an attempt to communicate it then goes back to ... sit in his coffin ???


Well, I knew that CSA is a safe airline as all (?) the pilots are "check pilots" and the planes ar OK- , but you can also be lucky to fly a BA T7.


H.A.

[regi]

Can you find a Swiss cheese large enough to have that many holes in it?
Leave alone having them all aligned !

* Poor design/maintenance of the infrastructure. No ground markings (TWY C/L), no TWY guidance signs / holding psn.
* Three (3) years before the incident, the CAA inspection noted the absence of holding psn signs and urgent (corrective) action was needed.
* Lack of signage not reported in AIP.
* No filing to ICAO of State difference with Annex 14.
* BA New Destination Assessment was made on "commercially available charts and Notams"; no site visit prior to commencing service.
* SATCO : "Misidentification of TWY B for A is a weekly occurence".
* First time there for both pilots, yet no taxi brief and the Commander is nose in with his checklist while F/O drives an unfamiliar/unclear taxi routing.
* Hint of ATCO "Alpha is parallel to the RWY", yet F/O goes straight onto Bravo. Intersection A is 1.2 km away from the terminal, B is right out of the apron. ANyone had a look, at the chart before?
* Cabin crew member in the cockpit; heard of sterile cockpit before?
* ATCO insufficiently clear with " Do you request backtrack ", instead of " Do you intend to take off from current BRAVO psn, not Alpha ? ".
* Answer "We're happy to go from ALPHA", unchallenged by ATCO.
* The Commander stated the RWY looks very short and advised PF to apply 55% N1 before brake release, without question any further the initial decision (intersection A instead of full RWY length) nor his actual position.
* There are Runway Distance Markers (on the LH side); not used by pilots though they entered the RWY at the 4000-ft mark (may not have been visible from the intersection tough) and the 3000, 2000 and 1000-ft must have been clearly visible. That's what RDM are for dude.
* The Station Enginer realizes the situation, makes an attempt to communicate it then goes back to ... sit in his coffin ???
Well, I knew that CSA is a safe airline as all (?) the pilots are "check pilots" and the planes ar OK- , but you can also be lucky to fly a BA T7.
H.A.

yep, that is what I mean by a combination of human errors. Going on already for years, as it seems. The only thing that did its job fine was the hardware.

[HAWK21M]

With so many checks in place...Its amazing that errors as such occur.....Thanks to the overpowered machine to save the day.