Kalitta Crash 25 May 2008 - Final Report

[OO-VEX]

The Final report on the Kalitta accident is available online
http://www.mobilit.fgov.be/data/aero/ac ... AA-8-5.pdf

Conclusion: Birdstrike and rejected take-off after V1.

Article from De Standaard http://www.standaard.be/Artikel/Detail. ... d=F12CHDRS

OO-VEX

[teddybAIR]

according to the report, the thrustreversers were not deployed! Moreover, if you look at the timetable, the loud bang is recorded 5 seconds after reaching V1 and 1 second after that, the trust levers were put to idle. That means 6 seconds between reaching V1 and the first corrective action that was taken. Add to that that one engine was not functioning and that the thrustreversers on the three remaining engines were not deployed and it is a miracle that the plane was arrested before the railway.

6 seconds after V1...wouldn't the plane be rotating by then?

[sdbelgium]

Looking at the take-off speed calculations, V1 was supposed to be 138 KIAS, while VR was set on 157 KIAS. Maximum speed reached that day was 152 KIAS. So, it would not have been rotating at the moment of the RTO.

[teddybAIR]

Ok, thx,

So it was 14KIAS over V1 and >441m passed the point where it reached V1 (I took 143Knots multiplied by 6 seconds and expressed in meters)...I'm only a very inexperienced PPL student, but what is the point in calculating V1 speeds if you can get away with exceeding it by 14KIAS/6seconds/441meters?!

The last thing I want to do is speculate, so I would like to ask the following question to the more experienced pilots on this forum: why would a captain refuse to get this aircraft airborn? I suppose the B742 can climb out on 3 engines?

I realise they had to decide in a split second and that it is easy to analyse our asses off from our chairs, but why not if it is for the sake of learning from past mistakes? After all, the outcome was (fairly) allright: no casualties!

Constructive regards,
bAIR

[sdbelgium]

Like you, I am a very inexperienced PPL student (7 hours on Piper) myself, so I'll probably be corrected by some of the more experienced airline guys.

A 747 can indeed climb out on three engines. The report also states that after a couple of seconds, the engine which ingested the bird had regained almost all of its original thrust (found on page 34 - §1.11 "Flight Recorders")

The analysis shows engine operating at take off power, then one (or more) is
experiencing a loss of power, followed by a saturation (bang). The sound
frequency is then moving to its original value, showing that the involved
engine(s) is recovering, until the moment the power is reduced, by the pilot.

The captain, however, experienced a bird strike (in the exact same airplane) some time before in ICN and that also influenced his decision to abort the take-off. He declared "to have had the feeling that the plane would not make it into the air" and called out "Reject". (can be found on page 51 - §2.5 "Pilot's impressions").

• The engine stall occurred at mid runway length. At this position, the slope
  of the runway increases from 0.62% to 0.93%. Although not seen on the
  FDR, this might have given the pilot the impression the aircraft slowed
  down. In his statement, the pilot said “he was under the impression the
  aircraft could not fly” after he heard the bang.
• The engine stall caused a loud bang, probably as loud, if not louder as
  the one the pilot experienced in Incheon with this very same aircraft, a few
  years back. It was a genuine engine failure then. The sound of the bang
  could have given the pilot the impression it was caused by something
  worse than what happened in Incheon.

[NCB]

I don't blame their decision to abort.
We're not talking about 3 young kids in their twenties but a highly experienced crew.

Anyone who has read anything about the Bijlmerramp knows what could happen when a number 3 engine of a B742F stalls during take-off... engines are made to separate from the wing under strong vibrational loads. Unfortunately, it is known that on the B742, when an inner engine separates the wing, it tends to merge outboard towards the outboard engine and take it along in its free-fall.
If the bang and vibrations were loud enough, I would have taken the same decision as this crew.

My only doubt is about the lack of T/R... in the report there is no report about any T/R being inop., so standard RTO procedures ask for T/R on remaining engines.
That could have made a difference.

Due to time pressure (TWR said that there was an aircraft inbound 25R), the crew did not have the time to go up to the end of 20 but the captain took a wide turn to take as much of runway 20 as possible prior to the take-off. That wide turn may have saved the aircraft from hitting the railway.
Reduced thrust was not a very wise decision considering the different factors, too much routine I guess.