7 convicted for 2005 Tuninter ATR72 ditch off Sicilian coast

[LX-LGX]

Related topic = about this crash in 2005:
viewtopic.php?f=7&t=12628

Today's news:
http://www.ansa.it/site/notizie/awnplus ... 34927.html

One article from ANSA (although a reliable source) isn't enough to transcript this judgement. Anyway - this is what ANSA says:

- seven people were convicted for their responsibility in the crash. The judge, who acquitted two defendants, also handed down sentences totalling 62 years;

- all nine defendants were Tunisian and included the plane's pilot and co-pilot and Tuninter top brass, all of whom were accused of multiple manslaughter and causing a disaster;

- Pilot and copilot each received 10-year sentences. Tuninter Director General and technical chief were sentenced to nine years while eight-year sentences were handed down to the budget airline's head of maintenance, chief mechanic and maintenance squad leader;

- None of the defendants were in court for the sentencing and a lawyer for Tuninter said they will appeal Monday's sentence;

- Italy's national agency for air transport safety (ANSV) concluded in September 2007 that the ATR 72 crashed because the aircraft did not take on sufficient fuel before leaving Bari because of a faulty fuel gage. According to the ANSV report, the day before the August 6 crash the fuel gage was replaced in Tunisia with one designed for an ATR-42 model, which is similar to the ATR-72 but has smaller fuel tanks.

- - -

Luchtvaartnieuws.nl mentions that the public proscecutor concluded that the cockpit crew should have been able to glide to Palermo airport, if they would have noticed the fuel shortage earlier.

http://www.luchtvaartnieuws.nl/news/?ID=30028

[TCAS]

The official Agenzia Nazionale per la Sicurezza del Volo (ANSV) accident report can be found H E R E (PDF)

Luchtvaartnieuws.nl mentions that the public proscecutor concluded that the cockpit crew should have been able to glide to Palermo airport, if they would have noticed the fuel shortage earlier.

2 ATR 72 simulator tests with 2 different highly experienced crews each.
1 crew just reached Palermo's threshold and the other ditched 1 mile short.

Remember: the Tuninter 1153 crew was

O/T
Aviation law and public/common interest respectation/interpretation can be different per Country.
If you have the right member card and/or upperclass connections, you can or may fly without valid license, make false medical application form statements and the authorities including the judicial system .........

In other words, You'll get away with it

[FlyAirbus]

According to Reuters, the Tunisian Captain paused to pray instead of taking emergency measures before crash-landing his plane

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldne ... -jail.html

[willem]

Instead of going for an airport he was aiming for mekka... stupid **** :sick: :sick:

[TCAS]

Instead of going for an airport he was aiming for mekka... stupid **** :sick: :sick:

Bullsh*t

From the FINAL ACCIDENT REPORT:

They were also requested for confirmation of the emergency condition.

In confirming this emergency, TUI 1153 repeatedly asked, three times (the controller had not perfectly understood the question, made in English), the distance to the airport.

The controller finally replied that the current distance from the TVOR-DME of Palermo “PRS” (located on the airport) was 48 nautical miles (NM).

The aircraft, with two engines shut down, was at an altitude of approximately 15.000 ft.

In view of the distance from Palermo in relation to the altitude, the crew of the TUI 1153 asked if there was any other terrain closer than Palermo on which they could land (“Is there any terrain nearest than Palermo Sir, please? We lose both engines and we are only 15.000 ft”), pointing out that they had lost both engines and were only at 15.000 ft of altitude.

The same request was repeated once more (“Any nearest airport where we can land?”) because the controller could not understand its content.

Palermo APP informed the aircraft that the emergency services had been alerted and gave the
radial value and the TVOR/DME distance from Palermo (“Radial 036°, 22 miles”).

After approximately 90 seconds the TUI 1153 informed to have seen two boats (“there are two boats”)
and that they had decided to turn left onto heading 180°, in order to ditch as close as possible to
them. He also confirmed that their altitude was 2200 ft.

A minute later TUI 1153 confirmed again that they were unable to reach the runway and that
they wanted to ditch near the two big boats (“we have two boats on the left-hand, big boats”)
that they could see on their left.

TUI 1153 also asked Palermo APP to inform the two boats of the situation.

Palermo APP answered that the emergency services were alerted (“We advice military”).

The communication with Palermo APP ended at approximately 13.37.

The actual CVR can be listenend H E R E (YouTube)

Both Pilots did their job professional till the last moment

BTW the ditch heading (111°) doesn't mean they're aiming for Mekka.

[willem]

Well that you fail to see the sarcasm in my message that's open for discussion, but i'm not convinced they did a "professional" job as you call it.
A "professional" pilot knows his figures, and fuel discrepancies "should" be spotted... Afterall it's the most important thing in a plane... (Besides a glider )

Anyway just my 2 cents... feel free to comment!

[TCAS]

A "professional" pilot knows his figures, and fuel discrepancies "should" be spotted... Afterall it's the most important thing in a plane... (Besides a glider )

Anyway just my 2 cents... feel free to comment!

Please read the official Agenzia Nazionale per la Sicurezza del Volo (ANSV) investigation report and listen to the actual CVR recording (YouTube).

Both pilots aviated till the last moment.

For incorrect FQI (Fuel Quantity Indicator) readouts (wrong series replacement FQI) the pilots can't be blaimed.

Only the mechanics and ATR (see below) can be blaimed.

Avions de Transport Régional or Aerei da Trasporto Regionale (ATR) now EADS made a serious FQI design 'connection' fault, -42 and -72 FQI's are interchangeable

It's Costra Nostra 'judicial aviation' incompetence to convict these pilots for 'just' doing their job professionally.

[FlightMate]

I don't know if the investigation report talks about the gauge readout at regular intervals, but if the gauge constantly overread the actual value, nobody could have made anything about it, in flight.

Furthermore, don't know about the ATR finesse, but gliding 48nm from 15.000 ft might be very difficult.

[TCAS]

I don't know if the investigation report talks about the gauge readout at regular intervals, but if the gauge constantly overread the actual value, nobody could have made anything about it, in flight.

Furthermore, don't know about the ATR finesse, but gliding 48nm from 15.000 ft might be very difficult.

Correct

2 ATR 72 simulator tests with 2 different highly experienced crews each.
1 crew just reached Palermo's threshold and the other ditched 1 mile short.

[LX-LGX]

Furthermore, don't know about the ATR finesse, but gliding 48nm from 15.000 ft might be very difficult.

Contrary to you, I haven't read the Italian court judgement. But based on three media reports (mentionned above), I assume that the Italian judge(s) and court experts noticed:

- when the right engine failed, they were at 22.940 ft. Some 100 seconds later, and at 21.340 ft, the second engine failed (thus not at 15.000 ft, as you suggest);

- the pilots knew about problems and human errors with the refueling;

- nearly 17 minutes had passed from the moment the first engine had shut down, to the ditching.

[TCAS_climb]

Should we expect pilots to know aircraft part number by heart and check each one of them before flight ?


James Reason summed it all when talking about maintenance: "(It) probably constitutes the single largest human performance problem facing most hazardous technologies. By the same token, they also offer the greatest opportunity for human factors improvements. Error by pilots, control room operators and other 'sharp-end' personnel may add the finishing touches to an organizational accident, but it is often latent conditions created by maintenance lapses that either set the accident sequence in motion or thwart its recovery."

[JAFflyer]

One question I have is: -do they know when the quantity indicators failed?
When it was already on the ground, they should have noticed it when calculating the fuel uplift versus the remaining fuel. When you then look at your indication and notice it's not correct, you should ask yourself some questions.
If it was in the air, same story applies, after take-off you calculate your ETA at all points along your route and check the fuel at your next crossing point...
From the info I read, I cannot be sure that they made such a crosscheck after take-off and we all know the price they paid...

[TCAS_climb]

Failed ?

The indicator never failed, the mechanics simply used wrong parts: they used ATR42 parts instead of ATR72 and put them into the fuel tank. Both types of parts look identical but have a different serial/part number.